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1	 Introduction
An estimated 175 million people, nearly three percent of the world’s popula-
tion, are international migrants.1 This figure includes refugees, displaced per-
sons, stateless persons, and (important for the purposes of this paper) migrant 
workers. The increase in migration in the contemporary age of globalisation 
means that “nearly all States have become or are becoming more multi-ethnic, 
multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-religious, and multi-lingual”.2 The movement 
of migrant workers is said to be caused by so-called ‘‘push’’ and “pull’’ factors. 
The “push’’ factors include the desire for a better standard of living, new oppor-
tunities and a better future, while the ‘‘pull’’ factors refer to the availability of 
relatively well-paid work in the receiving country. The labour migration process is 
further aided by ever-improving systems of communication and transportation.
However, it must be noted that these ‘‘push’’ and ‘‘pull’’ factors are not 
exhaustive, and do not reflect the involuntary nature of a large portion of labour 
migration. Many people also migrate to escape situations of violence, perse-
cutions, environmental degradation and human rights violations. It is increas-
ingly difficult to make a clear distinction between migrants who leave their 
countries because of the latter factors and those who do so in search of condi-
tions of well-being that do not exist in their countries of origin. The common 
theme is that migrants want to improve their quality of life. Most migration is 
between neighbouring countries, but the aforementioned greater access to glo-
bal information and cheaper transport means that geography now poses less of 
* This paper was written during an extended period of residence at the Max-Planck-Institut für Auslän-
disches und Internationales Sozialrecht (MPI) in München, Germany  I am grateful to the MPI for its 
generous financial support  I would like to thank Ulrich Becker, Alexander Graser, Marius Olivier, Ni-
cola Smit and Bernd Schulte for their useful comments on earlier drafts  I would also like to express my 
gratitude to Bradley Greenhalgh, who provided invaluable research and technical assistance
1 See Sivakumaran “The Rights of Migrant Workers One Year On: Transformation or Consolidation?” 200 
Georgetown Journal of International Law 11  The term “international migrant” is defined in part 2
2 Taran “Human Rights of Migrants: Challenges of the New Decade” 2000 International Migration 7 9  
Even though South Africa will not be the focus of this paper, it may be worth mentioning that it is esti-
mated that South Africa itself attracts between 500,000 and 1,5 million migrants annually, of which 75% 
are migrants from other African countries  See Fakier The Internationalization of the South African 
Labour Markets: The Need for a Comparative Research Agenda 1 Paper presented to a workshop on A 
Decent Work Research Agenda for South Africa University of Cape Town -5 April 2007
 See Sivakumuran 200 Georgetown Journal of International Law 11
 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur Human Rights of 
Migrants (January 2000) par 0
a barrier to movement than it had in the past.5 It is clear that the global migrant 
workforce has increased significantly in recent years, especially within the 
low- and semi-skilled job sectors. It is estimated that there are today over 80 
million economically active migrants (excluding refugees) the world over, of 
whom some 27 million are in the developing regions.7
For many people, international migration can be a productive experience. 
This is especially true for highly skilled migrants who are concentrated at the 
top of the employment ladder. Millions of professional workers travel to other 
countries every year in search of higher wages or greater opportunities.8 Most 
countries welcome the arrival of professionals from other countries, with some 
(most notably Australia and Canada) even actively encouraging it.9 On the 
other hand, for many migrants at the bottom of the employment ladder, the sit-
uation is often very different. They tend to do the jobs that are dirty, dangerous 
and difficult (so-called ‘‘3-D’’ jobs), which once they become ‘‘migrant jobs’’, 
tend to remain migrant jobs.10 Migrants in these jobs tend to suffer poor work-
ing and living conditions, often far inferior to those available to the citizens 
of the home countries themselves. This holds especially true for ‘‘irregular’’ 
migrants,11 whose unauthorised status (however defined) makes them subject 
to removal and possible prosecution for immigration violations at all times. 
These migrants usually lack access to many, if not most, civil and labour rights 
and social benefits, and they are afraid to avail themselves of the rights that 
they may enjoy for fear of exposure to immigration authorities.12
In this respect, the role of international and regional human rights instru-
ments in protecting the human rights of all migrant workers has become 
increasingly important. The extent to which these international instruments 
protect the human rights of migrant workers, in particular their right of access 
to social security, will be the focus of this paper. Although migrant workers 
enjoy the protection, as do all individuals, of a range of international1 and 
5 International Labour Office Towards a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in the Global Economy (200) 
 See Paoletti “Human Rights for All Workers: The Emergence of Protections for Unauthorized Workers in 
the Inter-American Human Rights System” 200 Human Rights Brief 5
7 ILO Fair Deal for Migrant Workers 7
8 While the foreign labour force in OECD countries between 1995 and 2000 grew by - per cent per year, 
the highly educated migrant labour force grew much faster – on average 5 per cent annually in the United 
Kingdom and 1 per cent in the United States: ILO Fair Deal for Migrant Workers 10
9 These two countries have introduced point systems that make it easier for professionals from developing 
countries to enter as immigrants: ILO Fair Deal for Migrant Workers 10  Other countries with similar 
policies to attract skilled labour include New Zealand, Germany, United Kingdom and the United States  
See International Labour Office ILO Migration Survey 2003 1
10 ILO Fair Deal for Migrant Workers 10
11 For the difference between ‘‘documented’’, “undocumented’’, “regular’’, ‘‘irregular’’, ‘‘legal” and ‘‘ille-
gal’’ migrants, see part 2 infra
12 As Taran 2000 International Migration 7 notes, “[u]nauthorised migrants are often treated as a reserve of 
flexible labour, outside the protection of labour safety, health, minimum wage and other standards, and 
easily deportable”  
1 Here I am referring to the so-called ‘‘International Bill of Rights’’, namely the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)  Other instruments include the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, the International 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation against Women (CEDAW)
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regional1 human rights instruments, a discussion of all these instruments falls 
beyond the scope of this paper. This study will focus on those instruments that 
relate specifically to the protection of migrant workers and their families, and 
whether and to what extent they safeguard the right to social security. These 
are the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families, adopted by the United Nations (UN) 
in 1990, as well as the following instruments adopted by the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO): Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) 
(No 97) and Recommendation (Revised) (No 8), adopted in 199, and the 
Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (No 1) and the 
Migrant Workers Recommendation (No 151), adopted in 1975.
While many extol the virtues of these international standards, others are more 
critical and more sceptical of their efficacy. In this paper, these competing claims 
will be investigated and analysed. After providing some definitional clarification 
in part 2, part  is devoted to an examination of the international instruments, 
in particular their treatment of the right to social security. Two important com-
mon themes, namely equality of treatment and maintenance of acquired rights and 
rights in the course of acquisition, are examined. In addition, the role of bilateral 
and multilateral international agreements is discussed – agreements that play a 
vital role in defining and strengthening the rights of migrant workers to social secu-
rity. In part , a number of issues come under closer scrutiny, including the (lack 
of) enforcement of international standards, whether the UN Convention provides 
effective protection to irregular migrants, and why, in practice, social insurance 
and social assistance are often subjected to differential treatment (and whether and 
to what extent that is justifiable). Part 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2	 Definitional	clarification
In the literature, reference is often made to the term ‘‘international migrants’’, 
of which ‘‘migrants’’ or ‘‘migrant workers’’ constitute one (albeit sizeable) part. 
Apart from migrant workers, the term ‘‘international migrants’’ also includes 
refugees,15 stateless persons and displaced persons. The focus of this article is 
on the extension of the right to social security specifically to migrant workers, 
although many of the arguments also apply, mutatis mutandis, to other catego-
ries of international migrants.
There is no commonly accepted generic or general legal concept of the 
‘‘migrant worker’’ in international law.1 Different definitions can be found 
in the various international instruments dealing with international migration. 
However, a useful starting point is to consider the definition contained in the 
1 Such regional instruments include the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the American Convention 
on Human Rights
15 Art 1A(2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 as modified by the 197 Protocol, 
defines a refugee as a person who, “owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of 
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country”  
1 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur Human Rights of 
Migrants par 28
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Work-
ers and Members of their Families (hereafter Migrant Workers Convention). 
The Convention17 defines a migrant worker as
“a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State 
of which he or she is not a national” (own emphasis).
The first distinction to be drawn is therefore the distinction between citizens (or 
nationals) and non-citizens (or non-nationals), with migrant workers, by defini-
tion, falling into the latter category.18 For the purposes of this study, all those who 
have not acquired the citizenship of the State of employment and are working or 
have worked in that country, are included in the definition of “migrant worker’’.
The question of citizenship is normally a matter regulated by domestic law 
in particular laws on immigration. Based upon the principle of ‘‘territorial 
sovereignty’’, it is generally accepted that a State has the power to exercise 
exclusive control over its physical domain, subject to limitations imposed by 
international law.19 This principle is also reflected in the Migrant Workers Con-
vention20 itself, where it is stated that
“(n)othing in the present Convention shall affect the right of each State Party to establish the criteria 
governing admission of migrant workers and members of their families”.
There is a clear and direct link between immigration policies and the ques-
tion of access to social security, because ‘‘undocumented’’ (or ‘‘irregular’’ or 
‘‘illegal’’)21 immigrants and asylum seekers are usually excluded from a coun-
try’s social security system.22 As mentioned earlier, the power of a sovereign 
State to regulate the entry of aliens and the discretion to confer nationality is not 
absolute, but is limited by principles of international law. These include limita-
tions imposed by human rights instruments such as the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, the African Charter of Human Rights and the 
European Convention on Human Rights,2 as well as by accords (be they bi-
lateral, regional or specialised) regarding migration for employment – accords 
through which States effectively relinquish their discretion to control the entry 
and expulsion of foreign nationals. In addition, the principle of non-refoule-
ment, which is the principle that prevents States from expelling or returning 
17 Art 2 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Mem-
bers of Their Families, 1990 (hereafter Migrant Workers Convention)  
18 There are of course many other distinctions that can be drawn, eg between long-term or short-term 
migrants and, within the category of short-term migrants, between frontier workers, seasonal workers 
and those studying or pursuing their careers abroad  These finer distinctions are examined in part  
infra
19 See Bosniak “Human Rights, State Sovereignty and the Protection of Undocumented Migrants under 
the International Migrant Workers Convention” 1991 International Migration Review 72 7: “States’ 
power to refuse entry and to expel aliens, and their discretion to confer nationality has been treated as an 
integral part of … territorial sovereign power since the late nineteenth century  As one analyst expressed 
it, ‘if a state is not free to decide who will enter its territory according to its own criteria and to regulate 
the conditions of such ingress, it is severely impeded in its function as the governing authority of the ter-
ritory in question’ ” See also Fournalos Sovereignty & Ingress of Aliens (198) 57
20 Art 79
21 This distinction will be further discussed in this part, infra
22 See Vonk “Migration, Social Security and the Law: Some European Dilemmas” 2002 European Journal 
of Social Security 17
2 Arts 1, 12() and (5), and  of the Fourth Protocol, respectively
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aliens who qualify as refugees to States where they run the risk of persecution, 
is now generally regarded as a principle of customary international law.2
This brings us to the second important distinction – one that flows directly 
from the first. Within the category of non-nationals or non-citizens, a distinc-
tion can be drawn between migrants legally authorised to be in the country (so-
called ‘‘regular’’ migrants) and those who enter or work in countries without 
legal authorisation (so-called ‘‘irregular’’ migrants). For many years, the term 
‘‘illegal’’ was attributed to migrants falling into the last category, but this cha-
racterisation has been criticised as normative and conveying the idea of crimi-
nality.25 As Taran writes,
“[the] ‘illegalization’ of migrants is the most dramatic manifestation of the … [tendency] to associate 
migrants and migration with crime and criminality, unemployment, disease, and other social ills”.2
It has also been pointed out that most migrants falling into this category 
have some place in the world where they can live lawfully.27 In response, the 
term ‘‘undocumented’’ was suggested, but this was similarly rejected as being 
incomplete since it does not apply to migrants who enter the host country 
legally (with tourist documents, for example), but then later violate their con-
ditions of entry by working.28
As a result, the term ‘‘irregular’’ is now generally used to describe migrants 
falling into this category, and will also be used in this paper.29 It avoids the 
overtly normative connotation of the term ‘‘illegal’’; does not disqualify those 
who entered legally but later violated their conditions of entry; and implies that 
the current status of the migrant may have arisen at various points (be it depar-
ture, transit, entry or return) and that it may be remedied at some point in time 
(either when the migrant returns to a place where his or her stay is permitted, 
or through an individual or collective regularisation of the migrant’s status by 
the host country).0 Bosniak1 provides a useful definition of who constitute the 
group of irregular migrants:
“As a rule, irregular migrants … are people who have arrived in the state of employment or residence 
without authorization, who are employed there without permission, or who entered with permission 
2 See Bosniak 1991 International Migration Review 7  Art (1) of the Geneva Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, 1951 provides that “no Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threat-
ened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion”
25 ILO Fair Deal for Migrant Workers 11
2 Taran 2000 International Migration 2
27 Groenendijk Introduction in Bogusz et al (eds) Irregular Migration and Human Rights: Theoretical, 
European and International Perspectives (200) xix
28 ILO Fair Deal for Migrant Workers 11
29 The Migrant Workers Convention appears to consider ‘‘undocumented’’ and ‘‘irregular’’ as interchange-
able terms  In art 5, the difference between the two categories of migrants are described as follows: “For 
the purposes of the present Convention, migrant workers and members of their families: (a) Are con-
sidered as documented or in a regular situation if they are authorized to enter, to stay and to engage in 
a remunerated activity in the State of employment pursuant to the law of that State and to international 
agreements to which that State is a party; (b) Are considered as non-documented or in an irregular situa-
tion if they do not comply with the conditions provided for in subparagraph (a) of the present article ” 
0 See Groenendijk Introduction xix and ILO Fair Deal for Migrant Workers 11
1 1991 International Migration Review 72  It is estimated that between 10 to 15 per cent of all migrants 
are irregular  In 2000, in Europe and the United States alone, there were an estimated 11 million irregular 
migrants  See ILO Fair Deal for Migrant Workers 11
and have remained after the expiration of their visas. The term frequently includes de facto refu-
gees (persons who are not recognized as legal refugees but who are unable or unwilling to return to 
their countries for political, racial, religious or violence-related reasons), as well as those who have 
migrated specifically for purposes of employment or family reunion.”
It becomes clear, when speaking of social security for non-citizens, that the 
position of both regular and irregular migrants must be investigated. More spe-
cifically, in examining the provisions of international instruments related to 
migrancy, the importance of the distinction (if any) between regular and irreg-
ular migrants has to be investigated. In other words, to what extent are the 
rights of migrant workers to social security affected by their status?
This brings me to a final conceptual clarification. In this paper, the concept 
of social security refers to the traditional twin pillars of social insurance and 
social assistance. Social insurance encompasses formalised programmes such 
as pensions, health insurance, maternity benefits and unemployment benefits 
and is financed by contributions that are either related to earnings or collected 
through payroll taxes. Social assistance, on the other hand, are formal pro-
grammes usually financed from tax revenues and include targeted resource 
transfers such as disability benefits, single-parent allowances, and ‘‘social pen-
sions’’ for the elderly poor that are financed publicly. However, there are many 
who argue that this is too narrow a construction of the concept of social secu-
rity, and that it is preferable to talk of the broader concept of ‘‘social protec-
tion’’, of which social insurance and social assistance are but two elements.2 
Those who adopt a broad approach to social protection include various pro-
grammes not normally viewed as part of conventional social security sys-
tems, such as universal primary education, micro-credit and job creation pro-
grammes, while others go even further and conceptualise social protection so 
broadly as to include the majority of development activities. However, in this 
paper, given the focus on the role of international organisations, especially 
the ILO, the narrower or more traditional definition of ‘‘social protection’’ as 
used by the ILO will be used. The ILO broadly defines “social protection’’ as 
old-age, survivor, and disability benefits, as well as unemployment compensa-
tion, financed by social insurance; tax-financed and means-tested social assist-
ance; and universal benefits (such as health care and child support), which are 
2 See Sabates-Wheeler & Waite Migration and Social Protection: A Concept Paper  Working Paper T2 
Institute of Development Studies, Essex, December 200  The terms “social security” and “social protec-
tion” are used rather loosely  The former generally refers to social security programs that are directed at 
meeting a specific need, are usually financed on the basis of contributions, and are available to beneficia-
ries on the basis of their participation and entitlements (although benefits are not necessarily proportional 
to contributions on an individual basis)  The latter term is intended to encompass both social security 
programs and other forms of benefits and services (such as family benefits, universal health care services, 
and minimum-income provisions) that are generally available on a universal basis without regard to par-
ticipation, contribution or employment status (although they may include a test of means)  In any event, 
the distinction is not a rigorous one  See Gillion “Social Security and Protection in the Developing World” 
199 Monthly Labor Review Online 2  
 See Sabates-Wheeler & Waite Migration and Social Protection 
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also tax-financed but not means-tested. As will become clear, the distinction 
between social insurance and social assistance is particularly significant in the 
context of access to social security for non citizens. As a rule, access to social 
assistance for non citizens has always been more problematic than access to 
social insurance.5
3	 International	instruments
3 1 ILO instruments
Migration has been one of the key issues for the ILO since its foundation in 
1919. The preamble to the Constitution of the ILO (Revised) emphasises the 
“protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than 
their own”. At the First Session of the International Labour Conference in 
1919, a recommendation7 was adopted which already reflected the two main 
aims of the ILO in this area, namely equality of treatment between nationals 
and migrant workers, and coordination of migration policies between States.8 
The Declaration of Philadelphia (concerning the aims and purposes of the 
ILO) in 19 also singled out the problems of migrant workers for special 
attention.9
The standard-setting of the ILO in this area has been concentrated in two 
main directions. In the first place, the Conference has endeavoured to establish 
the right to equality of treatment between nationals and non-nationals in the 
field of social security and, at the same time, to establish an international sys-
tem for the maintenance of acquired rights and rights in the course of acquisi-
tion for workers who transfer their residence from one country to another.0 In 
this regard, four Conventions and two Recommendations have been adopted, 
namely the Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention, 1925 
(No 19) and Recommendation, 1925 (No 25); the Maintenance of Migrants’ 
Pension Rights Convention, 195 (No 8); the Equality of Treatment (Social 
Security) Convention, 192 (No 118); and the Maintenance of Social Security 
 See ILO World Labour Report: Income Security and Social Protection in a Changing World (2000) 29; 
ILO Principles of Social Security (1998) 8  See also Brand “Social Protection of Work” 2001 Monthly 
Labor Review Online (page number unknown)
5 This will be explored in part  infra
 See Constitution of the International Labour Organization (April 1919) available at http://www ilo org/
public/english/about/iloconst htm (last accessed on 2 February 2007)  For a detailed analysis of the early 
activities of the ILO in the area of migration, see Karatani “How History Separated Refugee and Migrant 
Regimes: In Search of their Institutional Origins” 2005 International Journal of Refugee Law 522-52
7 The Reciprocity of Treatment Recommendation, 1919 (No 2)
8 ILO Migrant Workers (87th Session of the International Labour Conference (1999)) par 2  It must be 
noted that the standards were worded in vague terms and granted equal treatment only with respect to 
specific fields of social security and under the conditions of reciprocity  See Hasenau “ILO Standards on 
Migrant Workers: The Fundamentals of the UN Convention and their Genesis” 1991 International Migra-
tion Review 90
9 It stressed that a part of the ILO’s obligations was “the provision … of facilities for training and the 
transfer of labour, including migration for employment and settlement”  See Karatani 2005 International 
Journal of Refugee Law 522
0 ILO Migrant Workers par 
Rights Convention, 1982 (No 157) and Recommendation, 198 (No 17).1 
Secondly, the Conference also adopted instruments that are concerned with 
finding comprehensive solutions to the particular problems facing migrant 
workers. These are the Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (No 
97) and Recommendation (Revised) (No 8), both adopted in 199, and the 
Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (No 1) and the 
Migrant Workers Recommendation (No 151), both adopted in 1975 to supple-
ment the 199 instruments. These instruments will be the focus of this study.
Finally, it must be noted that with the exception of the instruments relating 
to migrant workers and other special categories of workers, the Conventions 
and Recommendations adopted by the ILO are of general application. That 
means that they cover all workers, irrespective of citizenship. The most signifi-
cant of these are the rights contained in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work.2 These relate to the topics of freedom of asso-
ciation and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the 
elimination of forced or compulsory labour, the abolition of child labour and 
the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.
3 2 The role of the United Nations
Within the United Nations (UN) system, standard-setting on migrant work-
ers fall squarely within the ILO’s sphere of competence. The ILO alone, among 
UN organisations, is constitutionally charged with the “protection of the inter-
ests of workers when employed in countries other than their own”. However, 
for a variety of reasons, political and otherwise, the ILO was circumvented 
in 1990 when the UN adopted the Migrant Workers Convention – an instru-
ment that has been described as the “epitome of international human rights”5 
and is considered to be one of the seven fundamental human rights instruments 
that define basic, universal human rights and ensure their explicit extension to 
vulnerable groups worldwide. The Convention entered into force on 1 July 
1 The last two instruments have particular relevance for migrant workers  Convention 118 provides for equality 
of treatment to be granted to workers of other ratifying countries as regards all nine branches of social security 
(medical care, sickness, unemployment, old-age, employment injury, family, maternity, invalidity, and survi-
vors’ benefits), although the obligations of the Convention may be accepted in respect of only one of these 
branches  The Convention provides that the payment of long term benefits shall be guaranteed, even when 
beneficiaries are resident abroad  These are guaranteed both to nationals of the ratifying State as well as to 
nationals of any other State that has accepted the obligations of the Convention for the corresponding branch  
Convention 157 provides for the establishment of an international system for the maintenance of rights under 
all branches of social security for persons who are working and staying outside their own countries
2 Adopted in 1998
 See Böhning “The ILO and the New UN Convention on Migrant Workers: The Past and the Future” 1991 
International Migration Review 98 700
 For a discussion of these, see Böhning 1991 International Migration Review 700-702
5 See Vargas “U S  Border Patrol Abuses, Undocumented Mexican Workers, and International Human 
Rights” 2001 San Diego LR 79; Sivakumaran 200 Georgetown Journal of International Law 115
 See Taran 2000 International Migration 17, referring to a discussion paper of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees Reconciling Migration Control and Refugee Protection in the European 
Union: a UNCHR Perspective (2000)  The other six human rights instruments are the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of Racism and Racial Discrimination (CERD), the 
Convention against Torture (CAT), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
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2003, and has a total of 35 ratifications and 28 signatures to date.7 The fact that 
it took more than ten years for the Convention to receive enough ratifications 
for it to enter into force is often viewed as a reflection of the broader general 
resistance to the recognition of the application of human rights standards to 
migrants, particularly irregular migrants.8
The Convention has four stated purposes.9 These are:
to unify the body of law applicable to migrant workers;
to complement other instruments;
to improve the distinctive status of migrant workers and their families; and
to reduce clandestine trafficking.
Although the UN Migrant Workers Convention is the most comprehensive 
instrument on the topic of migrant workers, it inevitably overlaps in some 
respects with the other ILO instruments referred to earlier.50
3 3 International instruments and social security rights
In general, the approach of international instruments to the protection of 
social security rights are similar, being confined to statements of general prin-
ciples rather than concerning themselves with the intricate details of the sub-
ject. The reason for this is the belief that the affirmation and maintenance of 
fundamental principles and general guidelines are better ensured at the univer-
sal multilateral level, whereas the technical matters arising in what is arguably 
a complex and diverse field are best left to bilateral or specific multilateral 
treaties.51
Before examining the social security provisions in the specific migrant 
workers instruments, an outline of other ILO standards concerned with social 
security warrant description, if only to indicate their degree of overlap with 
(and sometimes even divergence from) the specialised migrant worker instru-
ments.52 Convention 102 of 1952 concerning Minimum Standards of Social 
Security entrenches, in article 8(2), the principle of equality of treatment 
between national and non-national workers in respect of contributory social 
security schemes, subject to any conditions of reciprocity provided for in bilat-
7 The most recent update of the list occurred on 2 January 200  It is interesting to note that the countries 
that have signed and/or ratified the Convention consist only of so-called ‘‘sending States’’  None of the 
major “labour-receiving’’ countries, that is States which primarily attract migrant labour, have to date 
either signed or ratified the Convention  South Africa has neither signed nor ratified the Convention  For 
a list of current signatories and ratifications, see http://www ohchr org/english/countries/ratification/1
htm (last accessed on 2 February 2007)
8 See Taran 2000 International Migration 18
9 See the preamble of the Convention
50 It has been pointed out by Nafziger & Bartel “The Migrant Workers Convention: It’s Place in Human 
Rights Law” 1991 International Migration Review 785 that this overlap with other ILO instruments, as 
well as with human rights instruments (such as the UDHR, ICESCR, ICCPR, ESC, etc), could turn out to 
be problematic: “For example, what happens when language in the (UN) Convention conflicts with cor-
responding language in another instrument? What happens if the language coincides, but interpretations 
under different enforcement mechanisms conflict?” 
51 See Cholewinski Migrant Workers in International Human Rights Law (1997) 11  
52 The ILO’s Committee of Experts have observed that the social security provisions in the migrant workers 
instruments should be read in the context of the other ILO standards concerned with social security  See 
Cholewinski Migrant Workers 11
•
•
•
•
eral and multilateral agreements. Echoing provisions contained in instruments 
that deal specifically with migrant workers, it permits exclusions of non-nation-
als in cases where benefits or part of benefits are payable wholly out of public 
funds.5 In other words, States parties have the right to exclude non-nationals 
from tax-funded or non-contributory social security benefits.5 One other con-
vention is specifically concerned with equal treatment between nationals and 
non-nationals in the area of social security. Convention 118 of 192 concern-
ing Equality of Treatment of Nationals and Non-Nationals in Social Security 
provides for equal treatment between nationals and non-nationals from other 
States parties in respect of the accepted branches of social security.55 Benefits 
are to be awarded without any condition of residence.5 There are nonetheless 
exceptions to this general principle. Similar to the provision in Convention 
102 that allows States some flexibility in respect of non-contributory benefits, 
it provides that conditions of residence of a prescribed duration may be pre-
scribed for receipt of such benefits. However, article 4(2) of Convention 118 
excludes medical care, sickness benefit, employment injury benefit and fam-
ily benefit from this requirement. In other words, non-nationals may have to 
fulfil prescribed periods of residence to be eligible for non-contributory ben-
efits other than the four benefits specifically referred to and mentioned above. 
Finally, Convention 157 of 1982 concerning the Establishment of an Inter-
national System for the Maintenance of Social Security Rights applies to all 
branches of social security, and establishes an international framework for the 
maintenance of acquired rights and rights in the course of acquisition for work-
ers who transfer their residence from one country to another.57 It further ensures 
the effective provision of benefits abroad when they return to their country 
of origin.58 The Convention permits States parties to give effect to their obli-
gations by concluding bilateral and multilateral agreements. However, these 
agreements need not cover all branches of social security, nor apply to all ca-
tegories of people.
The provisions of the instruments specifically focused on migrant workers, 
namely ILO Conventions 97 and 1, ILO Recommendations 8 and 151, and 
the UN Migrant Workers Convention, will now receive more detailed discus-
sion. Like its predecessors, ILO Convention No 97 (and Recommendation No 
8) contains a set of standards on the organisation of migration and equality 
of treatment.59 However, in contrast to the earlier instruments, the set of stand-
ards in Convention 97 is more elaborate, while simultaneously reflecting a 
more flexible response to the needs of migrant workers. It is important to note 
5 See art 8(1)
5 This issue is discussed in more detail in part  infra
55 Art 2(1) provides that member States may accept the obligations of this Convention in respect of any one 
or more of the following branches of social security for which it has in effective operation legislation 
covering its own nationals within its own territory: (a) medical care; (b) sickness benefit; (c) maternity 
benefit; (d) invalidity benefit; (e) old-age benefit; (f) survivors’ benefit; (g) employment injury benefit; 
(h) unemployment benefit; and (i) family benefit
5 Art (1)
57 Part III
58 Part IV
59 The preceding 199 Convention had by 19 not been ratified by any State and therefore did not come into 
force
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that neither Convention 97 nor Convention 1 draws any distinction between 
workers who have migrated for permanent settlement, and those who have 
migrated for short-term or even seasonal work.0 However, certain categories 
of migrants are expressly excluded from the protection afforded by one or the 
other of the two instruments. These are:
frontier workers;1
members of the liberal professions and artistes who are given permission to 
enter for an (undefined) short duration;2
persons coming specifically for the purposes of training and education; 
and
employees of organisations or undertakings operating within the territory of 
a country who have been admitted temporarily to that country at the request 
of their employer to undertake specific duties or assignments for a limited 
and defined period of time and who are required to leave that country on the 
completion of their duties or assignments.
This last provision essentially applies to those workers who have special 
skills and who go to another country to undertake specific short-term assign-
ments.5 However, the Committee of Experts of the ILO has pointed out that 
the provision does not imply that all fixed-term workers can be excluded from 
the provisions of Convention 1. Finally, the Committee of Experts point 
out that seasonal migrant workers are not excluded from Conventions 97 and 
143, and “should therefore benefit from equality of opportunity and treat-
ment”.7 However, the extent to which they will really be able to benefit from 
national policy will depend on the length of time they stay in the country of 
employment.8 It should be noted that the UN Migrant Workers Convention 
goes beyond the definitions contained in the ILO instruments by including ca-
tegories of workers thus far excluded, namely frontier workers, seasonal work-
ers, seafarers, workers on offshore installations, itinerant workers, project-tied 
0 The only exception can be found in Convention 97 (and also the Model Agreement annexed to Recom-
mendation 8), which contains a few provisions that grant more far-reaching rights for migrants and 
their families who have been admitted on a permanent basis  See Böhning The Protection of Temporary 
Migrants by Conventions of the ILO and the UN, Presentation to the Workshop on Temporary Migration: 
Assessment and Practical Proposals for Overcoming Protection Gaps at the International Institute for 
Labour Studies, Geneva (18-19 Sept 200)
1 The term is not defined in either of the ILO Conventions  It seems to refer to workers who cross national 
borders on a temporary basis to work, and who return daily, weekly or monthly to their place of domi-
cile  In Germany, for example, a frontier worker is a person who, “while maintaining his domicile in the 
frontier region of a given country, is employed as a wage-earner in the frontier region of a neighbouring 
country and returns to his place of domicile at least once a week”  Malaysia interprets the term to mean 
“persons crossing national frontiers with temporary permits or visas to work and recrossing the frontiers 
after each day’s work or after a short period of work, e g , one week or one month continuously”  See ILO 
Migrant Workers par 112  However, it is defined as follows in art 2 of the UN Migrant Workers Conven-
tion: “The term ‘frontier worker’ refers to a migrant worker who retains his or her habitual residence in a 
neighbouring State to which he or she normally returns every day or at least once a week ” 
2 Art 11 2(b) in both Conventions
 Art 11 2(d) Convention 1
 Art 11 2(e) Convention 1
5 ILO Migrant Workers par 115
 ILO Migrant Workers par 115
7 ILO Migrant Workers par 78
8 ILO Migrant Workers par 78
•
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workers, and self-employed workers.9 Part V of the Convention (articles 57-
) establishes special protections for these categories of workers.
Article 6 of Convention 97 confirms the principle of equality of treatment, and 
prohibits inequality of treatment between “immigrants lawfully within its terri-
tory” and nationals in four areas, namely employment rights, trade union rights, 
social security rights, and accommodation rights. Social security benefits are those 
stemming from legal provisions in respect of employment injury, maternity, sick-
ness, invalidity, old-age, death, unemployment and family responsibilities, and any 
other contingency which, according to national laws or regulations, is covered by 
a social security scheme.70 In contrast, Convention 1 (which supplements Con-
vention 97) refers to “social security’’ in general, but this provision has to be read 
in conjunction with the aforementioned provision of Convention 97.71
The principle of equal treatment is, however, narrowly applied, in that ine-
quality of treatment is only proscribed when it is “regulated by law or regula-
tions, or [is] subject to the control of administrative authorities”.72 The princi-
ple is expanded by the subsequent Convention 1,7 which provides that the 
State undertakes to promote and guarantee
“equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation, of social security, of 
trade union and cultural rights and of individual and collective freedoms for persons who as migrant 
workers or as members of their families are lawfully within its territory”.
Nevertheless, the equality of treatment is subject to the following express 
limitations: there may be appropriate arrangements for the maintenance of 
acquired rights in the course of acquisition,7 and, more importantly, national 
laws or regulations of immigration countries may prescribe special arrange-
ments concerning benefits or portions of benefits which are payable wholly out 
of public funds,75 and concerning allowances paid to persons who do not fulfil 
the contribution conditions prescribed for the award of a normal pension.7
It has been pointed out that, while Convention 1 represents an improve-
ment over Convention 97, a number of problems remain. In the first place, as 
equality is sought with nationals, where the treatment of nationals themselves 
is poor, the situation of migrant workers is not affected.77 Secondly, where 
migrants are carrying out work not done by nationals, the lack of comparator 
may make it difficult, if not impossible, to compare differential treatment.78 
Thirdly, and most significantly, none of the ILO instruments protect migrants 
in an irregular situation – the very group of persons arguably most in need of 
protection. In this regard, the UN Migrant Workers Convention breaks new 
9 For definitions of all these terms, see art 2 UN Migrant Workers Convention
70 Art  1(b) Convention 97
71 Art 10 Convention 1  
72 Art  1(a)
7 Art 10
7 Art  1(b)(i) Convention 97
75 This means that social security benefits financed out of public funds on a non-contributory basis may be 
restricted to nationals  See Cholewinski Migrant Workers 11
7 Art  1(b)(ii) Convention 97
77 See Sivakumaran 200 Georgetown Journal of International Law 120
78 Sivakumaran 200 Georgetown Journal of International Law 120  The author points out that this is a 
very real problem given the fact that migrant workers often undertake work that nationals are unwilling 
to carry out
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ground. In the first place, it includes the families of migrant workers within 
the scope of the Convention.79 Secondly, it is applicable to all migrant workers, 
regardless of reciprocity80 and irrespective of their status.81 In this regard, it has 
been hailed as the “most ambitious statement to date of international concern 
for the problematic condition of undocumented migrants”.82 In the preamble, 
the Convention recognises that “workers who are non-documented or in an 
irregular situation are frequently employed under less favourable conditions of 
work than other workers”, and that “the human problems involved in migration 
are even more serious in the case of irregular migration”.8
However, despite acknowledging the precarious situation of non-docu-
mented migrants, the Convention nevertheless still differentiates between reg-
ular and irregular migrant workers by providing the former with additional 
rights. Part III of the Convention extends certain rights to all migrant workers 
and their families, while Part IV provides additional rights only to those work-
ers and their families who are documented or in a regular situation. It thus cre-
ates, in effect, two classes of human rights protection. For example, States par-
ties are entitled to discriminate against undocumented migrants with respect to 
rights to family unity, liberty of movement, participation in the public affairs 
of the State of employment, equality of treatment with nationals as regards the 
receipt of various social services, equality of treatment for family members, 
freedom from double taxation, and further employment protections and trade 
union rights, among others.
79 In art , “members of a family” are defined as persons who are married to migrant workers, plus their 
dependent children  However, these also include persons who are in a relationship with migrant workers 
“that … produces effects equivalent to marriage”  The vagueness of this definition has been criticised  
See Nafziger & Bartel 1991 International Migration Review 78-787
80 This principle (of non-reciprocity) is also enshrined in ILO Conventions 97 and 1  This means that 
so long as the country of employment has ratified the Convention in question, the social security rights 
of migrants are to be respected, irrespective of whether the migrant worker’s home country has ratified 
the instrument  However, during negotiations on the drafting of the UN Migrants Convention, the Ger-
man representative, joined by others, had argued unsuccessfully for inclusion of a reciprocity clause that 
would have permitted a State to limit its obligations under the Convention to nationals of other State par-
ties  Such a reciprocity clause would have avoided the asymmetry of requiring a State to protect the rights 
of particular nationals without a positive assurance that the State’s own nationals would enjoy protection 
in the territory of the other State – ie, in the State of the protected nationals  It has been pointed out that the 
absence of such a clause may inhibit ratification and accession to the Convention  See Nafziger & Bartel 
1991 International Migration Review 78  This may be one of the reasons for the fact that as of December 
2005, the Convention has been ratified only by so-called ‘‘migrant sending’’ countries
81 For the sake of completeness is must be mentioned that the recent ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour 
Migration, adopted by a tripartite meeting of experts in November 2005, proposes that “where appropri-
ate”, social security coverage and portability of benefits should be extended to “migrant workers in an 
irregular situation” (par 9 9)  The document is available at http://www ilo org/public/english/standards/
relm/gb/docs/gb295/pdf/tmmflm-1 pdf (last accessed on 2 February 2007)
82 Bosniak 1991 International Migration Review 70  The extension of certain rights to irregular migrants 
did not occur without significant opposition  During the drafting process, many countries argued that 
extending rights to these workers would encourage and even reward someone for violating a country’s 
borders  Many of those in favour of extending rights to irregular migrants in the end used instrumental as 
opposed to normative reasoning to support their position  They argued that extending rights to migrants 
in an irregular situation ‘‘would discourage employers from hiring such workers and improve conditions 
for national workers’’  See Cholewinski Migrant Workers 187
8 However, it must be noted that the Convention does distinguish between regular and irregular migrant 
workers by providing the former with additional rights (Part III provides rights to all migrant workers and 
their families, while Part IV provides additional rights only to those workers and their families who are 
documented or in a regular situation)  It thus creates, in effect, two classes of human rights protection
This differentiation between regular and irregular migrants must be viewed 
against the background of the persistent tension that the entire field of human rights 
suffers from, namely between the principles of universal human rights and those of 
State sovereignty. In the migration context, human rights and territorial principles 
meet and compete in two different regulatory domains.8 In the first, namely that 
governing matters concerning the admission and expulsion of aliens into and from 
a national territory, the tension “has largely been resolved in favor of the State”.85 
The second domain concerns the States’ general, non-immigration-related treat-
ment of aliens who are present within their territory. Here, Bosniak8 points out, 
“the interplay between the principles of States’ territorial powers and their human 
rights obligations is more complex”. Generally speaking, in this internal domain, 
all human beings are viewed as theoretically entitled to internationally-guaranteed 
standards of treatment with respect to fundamental rights. Yet no State is required 
to treat aliens, including legal resident aliens, identically with citizens. Restric-
tions for aliens are written into various human rights instruments, but even in the 
absence of such explicit restrictions, States themselves limit a variety of rights 
to nationals, and such action is generally treated as legitimate under international 
law.87 Just how much and to what extent States may limit rights granted to aliens 
is a matter of ongoing controversy. However, it is clear that “(t)he discrimination 
permitted against undocumented aliens exceed, by far, the discrimination permit-
ted against most other classes of aliens”.88
For a variety of reasons,89 international law treats the power of States to dis-
criminate as both greater and more vital with respect to irregular immigrants.90 
This is also reflected in the UN Convention, which, despite extending substan-
tial human rights protections to undocumented migrants, also makes it clear 
that their irregular status makes these migrants less entitled to international 
protection than other migrants.91
However, as far as social security is concerned, the UN Convention extends 
this right to all migrants, irrespective of status.92 Article 27 reads as follows:
8 See Bosniak 1991 International Migration Review 75
85 Bosniak 1991 International Migration Review 75
8 1991 International Migration Review 75
87 See Bosniak 1991 International Migration Review 75
88 Bosniak 1991 International Migration Review 755
89 States mainly view the presence of irregular migrants both as a violation of their sovereign exclusion-
ary powers and as a breach of the social contract which bind the nation  See Bosniak 1991 International 
Migration Review 755
90 See Bosniak 1991 International Migration Review 755
91 The hope is that the carrot of additional benefits and protections for migrants in a regular situation may 
encourage undocumented migrants to seek to regularise their status  See Nafziger & Bartel 1991 Interna-
tional Migration Review 78
92 Cholewinski Migrant Workers 15-1 points out that it is not entirely clear from the drafting history 
of the Convention whether art 27 applies to irregular migrants to the same extent as it does to regular 
migrants  A clause in the draft text explicitly limited the application of the equality principle in respect of 
irregular migrants to those social security benefits to which they had contributed  However, this clause 
was removed during the second reading of the text  Cholewinski nevertheless concedes that the presence 
of art 27 in Part IV, which applies to all migrants, irrespective of status, removes any doubt that it was 
intended to apply to both regular and irregular migrants  It must be noted that extending social security 
rights to all workers, irrespective of status, reflects the position adopted in other human rights instru-
ments  See UDHR arts 22 and 25(1), ICESCR art 9, ICEAFRD art 5(e) and ESC art 12
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“1. With respect to social security, migrant workers and members of their families shall enjoy in the 
State of employment the same treatment granted to nationals in so far as they fulfil the require-
ments provided for by the applicable legislation of that State and the applicable bilateral and 
multilateral treaties. The competent authorities of the State of origin and the State of employment 
can at any time establish the necessary arrangements to determine the modalities of application 
of this norm.
2. Where the applicable legislation does not allow migrant workers and members of their families a 
benefit, the States concerned shall examine the possibility of reimbursing interested persons the 
amount of contributions made by them with respect to that benefit on the basis of the treatment 
granted to nationals who are in similar circumstances.”
Article 27(1) is a ‘‘framework provision’’ and not self-executing. The rea-
son is that it refers not only to the applicable legislation, but also to the terms 
of bilateral and multilateral agreements that have to be fulfilled. By virtue of 
these provisos, States parties can adopt provisions that would, for example, 
differentiate between regular and irregular migrants, thereby negating the pro-
tection that the article is meant to confer on all migrants, irrespective of their 
status. The article does not require reciprocity for social security provisions 
to take effect, and therefore applies to migrant workers who are nationals of 
States that have not ratified the Convention. Article 27(2) applies to migrant 
workers’ rights in the course of acquisition. This refers to migrant workers who 
have left their employment in the country in which they are not nationals, have 
acquired rights in that State, but not the right to receive benefits abroad. The 
protection that article 27(2) provides is rather weak, urging States to “exam-
ine the possibility’’ of reimbursing the contributions of migrant workers and 
their families in cases where the applicable legislation does not permit them to 
receive benefits. This is in contrast to more strongly worded protection offered 
by the relevant ILO instruments.9 It must also be noted that the lack of defi-
nition of ‘‘social security’’ raises doubts whether the term includes non-con-
tributory benefits, from which migrant workers are often excluded.9 Finally, 
article 27 is a statement of general principle and therefore does not define the 
scope of social security. However, at least two branches of social security are 
covered by other Convention provisions. Article 25 refers to equality of treat-
ment between nationals and migrant workers in respect of remuneration and 
other conditions of work, and arguably covers the right to employment injury 
benefits.95
Article 28 covers emergency medical care. It provides that
“(m)igrant workers and their families shall have the right to receive any medical care that is urgently 
required for the preservation of their life or the avoidance of irreparable harm to their life on the basis 
of equality of treatment with nationals of the State concerned … [and] … [s]uch emergency care shall 
not be refused them by reason of any irregularity with regard to stay and employment”.
9 Eg, art 9(1) of Convention 1 protects the social security rights of migrant workers arising out of “past 
employment’’, and Recommendation 151 stipulates in par (1)(c)(ii) that all migrant workers who leave 
the country of employment should be entitled to ‘‘reimbursement of any social security contributions 
which have not given and will not give rise to rights under national laws or regulations or international 
arrangements’’
9 See discussion in part  infra
95 See Cholewinski Migrant Workers 17
The right to emergency care has been called the “bottom line with regard to 
access to social benefits for illegal migrant workers”.9 What is considered as 
‘‘emergency care’’ and how access to it is guaranteed, differ across countries. 
In a recent survey, Pieters & Schoukens97 report that while the right to emer-
gency care is not questioned, some countries would charge the person who 
entered the country with the sole purpose of obtaining free care. Some coun-
tries go even further and allow the undocumented migrant in need of urgent 
care to be treated by a medical doctor, but the patient is then obliged to refund 
the costs for the delivered health care.98 Undocumented migrants are thus in 
practice often not entitled to subsidised care for emergency medical treatment. 
As far as the definition of emergency care is concerned, the authors report that 
despite the evolving interpretation of the term, there is common understanding 
that undocumented migrants should be covered for the following: outpatient 
and hospital care which is urgent or otherwise essential even if continuous; 
medical programmes which are preventive or which safeguard individual and 
collective health; maternity coverage; health coverage of minors; vaccinations 
foreseen by public health law; diagnosis, treatment and prevention of infective 
diseases; and activities of international prevention.99
3 4 International agreements
International social security agreements between countries – whether bilat-
eral or multilateral – have been in use for a long time.100 In 200, the ILO 
reported that most countries surveyed had signed bilateral agreements, mainly 
on labour migration and social security.101 The ILO survey102 also confirmed 
that most of these agreements were signed in the last fifteen years, verifying 
the trend of a revival of these agreements. The advantages of these agreements 
are that they can be adapted to the particularities of specific groups of migrants, 
and that both the sending and receiving State can share the burden of ensuring 
adequate living and working conditions as well as monitoring the migration 
processes.10
9 Pieters & Schoukens Exploratory Report on the Access to Social Protection for Illegal Labour Migrants 
Paper presented at the ISSA European Regional Meeting Migrants and Social Protection in Oslo (21-2 
April 200) 11
97 Exploratory Report 11
98 Pieters & Schoukens Exploratory Report 11
99 Pieters & Schoukens Exploratory Report 11
100 The history of international social security agreements goes back to the latter part of the 19th century  
The first treaties were concerned with accidents at work  Eg, the 1882 agreement and 1897 Convention 
between France and Belgium introduced the fundamental principle of all subsequent international social 
security agreements, namely that of equal treatment  See Roberts Migration and Social Security: Paro-
chialism in the Global Village in Sigg & Behrendt (eds) Social Security in the Global Village (2002) 21
101 ILO ILO Migration Survey 2
102 2
10 ILO Migrant Workers par 7  The purpose of bilateral agreements has been described as follows: 
“Although international standard-setting activities provide a framework which may be regarded as indis-
pensable for the elaboration of bilateral agreements between the countries of origin of migrant workers 
and the host countries, such bilateral agreements are still necessary in order to give precise application to 
international principles and settle specific problems ” See 2 UN ESCOR Commission for Social Devel-
opment Welfare of Migrant Workers and Their Families. Principles Concerning Migrant Workers and 
Their Families Already Embodied in International Instruments Adopted by United Nations Organiza-
tions: Report of the Secretary-General 11 (UN doc  E/CN 5/5 (1978))
2 STELL LR 2007 2
MIGRANT WORKERS AND THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL SECURITY 25
The ILO has actively recommended the adoption of bilateral instruments as 
a means of managing migration flows more effectively. For example, Recom-
mendation No 8 contains a model bilateral agreement, and several provisions 
of Conventions 97 and 1 emphasise the importance of bilateral cooperation 
in the field of migration.10
The purpose of these agreements105 is to ameliorate the various disadvan-
tages faced by migrants by regulating the respective reciprocal obligations 
of the signatory countries. Indeed, the underlying principle informing such 
agreements is reciprocity of the treatment afforded to migrant nationals of the 
two contracting countries.10 In general, five principles underpin international 
agreements. These are:
equality of treatment (or the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality in respect of rights and obligations under the legislation of each 
of the contracting parties);
determination of applicable legislation (to prevent migrant workers from 
being insured in both countries or, in the worst case scenario, from not being 
insured in either country’s scheme);
maintenance of acquired rights (ensuring that any right to a benefit, or paid-
up prospective right, should be guaranteed to the migrant in either country, 
even if it has been acquired in the other);
maintenance of rights in the course of acquisition (ensuring that where a 
right to a benefit is conditional upon the completion of a qualifying period, 
account should be taken of periods served by the migrant worker in each 
country); and finally,
payment of benefits abroad (ensuring that there is no restriction on the pay-
ment, in any of the countries concerned, of benefits for which the migrant 
has qualified in any of the others).107
It is important to note that these principles, which are the cornerstone of 
bilateral and multilateral instruments, are reflected in a variety of ILO instru-
ments on social security.108
International social security agreements use five methods to ameliorate the 
disadvantages faced by migrants. These are:
10 ILO Migrant Workers par 77
105 See ILO Introduction to Social Security (1989) 152 et seq
10 See Paparella Social Security Coverage for Migrants: Critical Aspects Paper presented at the ISSA Euro-
pean Regional Meeting Migrants and Social Protection in Oslo (21-2 April 200) 17  
107 See, eg, ILO Standards for the XXIst Social Security (2002) 1-; ILO Social Security for Migrant 
Workers (199) 8-20; ILO Social Security for Migrant Workers (199) ; Creutz “The ILO and Social 
Security for Foreign and Migrant Workers” 198 International Labour Review 51 and Netter “Social 
Security for Migrant Workers” 19 International Labour Review 1
108 See the Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention 19 of 1925; the Maintenance of 
Migrants’ Pension Rights Convention 8 of 195; the Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention 
118 of 192; the Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention 157 of 1982; the Social Security (Sea-
farers) Convention (Revised) 15 of 1987; the Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Recom-
mendation 25 of 1952; the Migration for Employment Convention  of 19; the Migration for Employ-
ment Recommendation 1 of 199; the Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) 97 of 199; the 
Migration for Employment Recommendation (Revised) 8 of 199; the Unemployment Convention 2 of 
1919; the Unemployment Convention  of 19; the Maternity Protection Convention  of 1919; and the 
Maternity Protection Convention 10 of 1952
•
•
•
•
•
the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality in respect 
of rights and obligations under the legislation of each of the contracting 
parties;
provisions to prevent a situation in which the migrant worker is not insured 
in either country’s scheme and thus without any social protection, or to pre-
vent him or her being insured in both;
aggregation of periods of insurance spent in each of the countries when cal-
culating entitlement to benefits;
proratarisation – that each of the countries pays a proportion of the pension 
determined by the period of insurance spent in each; and
export of benefits.109
While international agreements undoubtedly play a vital role in defining 
and strengthening the rights of migrant workers to social security, they are not 
without their shortcomings. In the first place, they only partially succeed in 
putting into practice the principles affirmed at multilateral level by the inter-
national Conventions.110 The reasons lie in the reciprocity principle, which 
was formulated in a historical context when migration took place on a much 
smaller scale than is the case today. Immigrant workers originate from a much 
larger number of countries than in the past, and many of these countries either 
do not have any bilateral agreements or have insufficient bargaining power to 
conclude them or to negotiate more favourable terms. There is also an absence 
of reciprocity in migrant flows (meaning that the flow of migrants is often 
one-directional rather than multi-directional), and finally, there is asymmetry 
between the economic, political, institutional and administrative conditions 
regulating pension and other social security policies in the emigrant and immi-
grant countries respectively.111
In the second place, the protection provided by bilateral agreements is vari-
able. While all provide for equal treatment, it is in some cases incomplete. For 
example, agreements entered into by Denmark include conditions requiring 
the satisfaction of past periods of residence or availability for work that does 
not apply to Danish nationals.112 Most of the agreements provide for aggrega-
tion of periods of insurance. In many cases, this does not cause any difficul-
ties. Where each country’s social security system is based on contributions, 
aggregation of periods of insurance involves simply adding together paid con-
tributions. However, not all social security schemes are contributory. Where 
one country’s scheme is based on paid contributions and the other is based on 
periods of residence or employment, aggregation rules must obviously take 
that into account. As a rule, aggregation rules in these types of situations pro-
vide for the aggregation of different types of periods. For example, the agree-
ment between Portugal and Australia aggregate Portuguese periods of insur-
ance with Australian periods of residence.11
109 See Roberts Migration and Social Security in Sigg & Behrendt Social Security 21  
110 See Paparella Social Security Coverage 12
111 Paparella Social Security Coverage 8-12
112 See Roberts Migration and Social Security 217
11 Roberts Migration and Social Security 218
•
•
•
•
•
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In the third place, bilateral agreements do not always provide for all contin-
gencies. The benefits included are, in the main, insurance-based benefits. At 
the core of most agreements are arrangements for long-term benefits that pro-
vide for invalidity, retirement and widowhood. Periods of insurance for these 
benefits are aggregated and the principle of “proratarisation’’ is utilised to dis-
tribute costs between the countries according to insurance. The benefits are 
also exportable. Less likely to be included are short-term benefits for maternity 
or sickness, and unemployment benefits are the least likely to make their way 
into these bilateral agreements.11
A final concern with international agreements is the fact that they seldom 
cover so-called ‘‘third-country nationals’’.115 Recent immigrants (or migrants) 
to Europe tend to come from countries outside the European Union,11 mean-
ing that they do not enjoy the benefit of bilateral social security agreements 
that member States concluded in the past with recruitment countries.117 The 
latest figures indicate that less than 25 per cent of international migrants work 
in countries with bilateral or multilateral social security agreements.118 These 
migrants are therefore dependent upon the treatment which is offered by the 
host State – treatment that varies from country to country and from benefit 
scheme to benefit scheme. Vonk119 points out that
“in every case [these] national standards fall far below international standards [as contained in interna-
tional agreements], particularly where they concern overcoming minimum insurance period require-
ments for entitlement to benefit, the possibility of exporting benefits abroad and claiming benefits for 
dependents who live outside the host-state”.
A recent report of the Global Commission on International Migration120 high-
lights the negative consequences that flow from the non-exportability of pen-
sions and social security entitlements – something that mainly affects migrants 
not covered by international agreements.
The reason for the dearth of bilateral agreements between developed coun-
tries and developing countries can be placed at the door of the reciprocity prin-
ciple. As Roberts121 points out, the important theoretical underpinning of the 
principle of reciprocity is that each party shares the costs and benefits on a 
11 Roberts Migration and Social Security 218
115 Roberts Migration and Social Security 212
11 Countries that do not have a bilateral agreement with any EU member country are mainly, but not exclu-
sively, developing countries  These are primarily countries in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa  In sub-
Saharan Africa, eg, Senegal is the only country that has entered into a bilateral agreement with an EU 
country, namely with France – its ex-colonial ruler  There is only one agreement with the Indian subcon-
tinent (between Denmark and Pakistan), and apart from the agreements between the Philippines and Italy 
and the Philippines and Spain, there are no agreements with any other Asian countries  Of the countries 
of Eastern Europe, only Poland (before joining the EU) had agreements with any of the EU member coun-
tries (with France, Germany, and Sweden)  Of the Middle Eastern countries, only Egypt has an agreement 
with a member country, namely with Italy  See Roberts Migration and Social Security 21  
117 See Vonk 2002 European Journal of Social Security 25
118 Global Commission on International Migration Migration in an Interconnected World: New Directions 
for Action (October 2005) 18
119 2002 European Journal of Social Security 25
120 Migration 18  Even though this problem pertains mainly to migrants not covered by international agree-
ments, it also affects those migrants covered by international agreements  This is because few agreements 
provide for exportability of all benefits, especially health care benefits
121 Migration and Social Security 220
reasonably equal basis. That assumes that the benefit schemes in the respective 
two countries must be reasonably compatible. While this may be the case with 
the social security schemes of developed countries (even when the one scheme 
is a contributory Bismarckian scheme and the other a tax-financed, residence-
based scheme), the schemes found in developing countries are often too differ-
ent to allow for reciprocity.122 There may be insurmountable technical difficul-
ties to aggregating periods of insurance paid, or time spent, in the sending and 
receiving countries, and there may also be obstacles to exporting benefits that 
require administrative oversight, such as unemployment, sickness, and possi-
bly incapacity benefits.12
However, there are no technical obstacles to extending equal treatment to 
migrants or to exporting retirement pensions. Roberts12 argues that in these 
situations, one needs to move beyond the principle of reciprocity and “rethink 
the obligations of the receiving country”. In this regard, he proposes unilateral 
action on the part of the receiving country.125 Along similar lines, Vonk12 calls 
upon the EU to impose, at the very least, a number of minimum requirements 
which apply unilaterally to the treatment of third country migrants, such as 
equality of treatment on grounds of nationality, exportability of benefits and 
alleviation from minimum insurance periods for the right to benefit.
4	 Discussion
4 1  Problems related to ratification and promotion of international 
agreements
The first decade after the adoption of the Convention was characterised by a 
lack of attention to its promotion – not only on the part of the UN itself – but 
also on the part of those governments which had played an active role in its 
preparation and design. As one commentator127 noted:
“Until January 2001, there was not one person anywhere in the world, in any international organiza-
tion, in any government, or any civil society group engaged with full-time responsibilities related to 
promoting this Convention. This contrasts sharply with the extensive numbers of staff, volunteers and 
collaborators mobilized by international secretariats that assured rapid entry into force of the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, The Convention on Desertification and … the Convention Against 
Anti-Personnel Landmines.’’
While lack of promotion of the Convention is one problem, lack of rati-
fication is another. It has already been noted that it took thirteen years for 
the UN Convention to garner enough ratifications to come into force.128 Many 
obstacles to ratification can be identified. After its adoption, many UN mem-
ber States have criticised the Convention as impracticable and unrealisable as 
122 Eg, some developing countries have provident funds that pay out a lump sum in the event of a contingency 
such as sickness or injury, and this may be incompatible with a scheme that pays out a continuing benefit  
See Roberts Migration and Social Security 220-221
12 See Roberts Migration and Social Security 221
12 Migration and Social Security 221
125 Migration and Social Security 221
12 2002 European Journal of Social Security 2
127 Taran 2000 International Migration 18
128 See part 2 supra
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an international standard in part because it is too ambitious and detailed, and 
because, in many cases, it departs from established human rights language.129 
The lack of publicity referred to above has also contributed to misconcep-
tions about the purpose of the instrument. As Cholewinski10 points out, many 
believe that an international convention that provides extensive human rights 
protection to migrant workers will only encourage more migration, especially 
irregular migration. This view persists despite the fact that one of the princi-
pal aims of the Convention is “to reduce irregular migration and its exploita-
tion”.11 In addition, extending rights explicitly to irregular migrants have also 
hindered ratification. During the drafting process, both Germany and the USA 
opposed granting rights to migrants in an irregular situation. However, such 
States are prevented by article 88 of the Convention from excluding this group 
of migrants on ratification and, as a result, are likely to decide not to ratify the 
Convention at all.12 Finally, it has been pointed out that the international and 
political situation worldwide is not conducive to the protection of the rights of 
migrant workers, partly due to the
“continuing uncertainty in the global economy, the deepening gulf between poor and wealthy nations, 
and the growth of permanent migrant populations with different racial and cultural backgrounds”.1
This has resulted in less sympathy for the condition of migrant workers and 
their families resident in developed countries of employment, which accounts 
for the absence of ratification by any of the so-called ‘‘migrant receiving 
States’’.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that none of the major “receiving States’’ have 
to date ratified the Convention, the ratification process has picked up some 
momentum since 2000 – so much so that by 200, the Convention had received 
the 20 ratifications necessary in order for it to enter into force. In addition, and 
significantly, many States have utilised the provisions of the Convention as a 
guide in drafting its own national migration laws. One notable example is Italy, 
which based much of its comprehensive national migration law of 1998 on the 
provisions and standards of the Convention.1
Finally, another positive development is the fact that the UN has started to 
pay increased attention to the issue of migrancy during the last few years. In 
the first place, the UN Human Rights Commission appointed a Special Rap-
porteur on the human rights of migrants in 1999, tasked with
“examin[ing] ways and means to overcome the obstacles existing to the full and effective protection 
of the human rights of migrants, including obstacles and difficulties for the return of migrants who are 
undocumented or in an irregular situation”.15
129 See Taran 2000 International Migration 19
10 See Cholewinski Migrant Workers 202 (citing Hume Equality of Treatment and the International Con-
vention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families in Cator & 
Niessen (eds) The Use of International Conventions to Protect the Rights of Migrants and Ethnic Minori-
ties 82)
11 Cholewinski Migrant Workers 202 (emphasis in original)
12 Cholewinski Migrant Workers 202
1 Cholewinski Migrant Workers 202
1 Taran 2000 International Migration 18
15 See Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1999/ (27 April 1999)  The initial mandate of the Spe-
cial Rapporteur was extended for a further three years in 2005: see Resolution 2005/7 (19 April 2005)
This was a critical step because, by mandating this Special Rapporteur, the 
UN acknowledged that violations of migrant human rights are as serious as 
“classic’’ human rights concerns such as torture, violence against women, rac-
ism and internally displaced persons, all areas for which Special Rapporteurs 
have been appointed.1 Secondly, three recent UN initiatives place the focus 
directly on international migration issues, and entail the following:
the establishment of an independent Global Commission on International 
Migration to study how to improve cooperation among UN and other inter-
national agencies;
the holding by the General Assembly of a two-day high-level dialogue on 
international migration and development in September 200;17 and
the establishment of the Global Migration Group by the International Organ-
isation on Migration, bringing together the heads of several major UN agen-
cies, including the ILO, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNHCR), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (UNHCHR).18
Whether this renewed focus on the issue of migration will bear any fruit is 
an open question, but it does represent a significant attempt on the part of the 
UN to address the general criticism that international efforts to defend human 
rights of migrants are “scattered’’, “fragmented’’ and ‘‘limited in impact’’.19
Similar difficulties that beset the UN Convention also plague the ILO Con-
ventions. During the last fifteen years there has been neither active promo-
tion nor any significant new ratification of the two ILO Conventions related to 
migrant workers’ rights.10 Ratification of the two ILO Conventions related to 
migrant workers’ rights has slowed to a trickle in the last decade. For exam-
ple, Convention 97 has been ratified by only five countries since 1996, and 
Convention 143 by only two, bringing the total number of ratifications for 
the two conventions to a disappointing 5 and nineteen respectively (out of a 
possible 178).11 In a survey done in 200, only twelve member countries indi-
cated that they intend to ratify Convention 97, and only ten indicated that they 
intend to ratify Convention 1. By contrast,  member countries indicated 
that they do not intend to ratify Convention 97, and 0 member countries gave 
the same response in respect of Convention 1.12 Obstacles to ratification of 
1 However, as Taran 2000 International Migration  notes, the Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Migrants (as do other Special Rapporteurs on thematic human rights issues) suffers from a significant 
lack of resources  The Rapporteur has only one half-time assistant, travel allocations for only one mission 
per year, and is offered no compensation other than coverage of travel expenses and per diem while on 
an official mission – a situation Taran 2000 International Migration  calls “a sad commentary on the 
funding priorities of many UN member governments”  
17 For a summary of the discussions, see http://www un org/esa/population/migration/hld/index html (last 
accessed on 9 February 2007)
18 See http://www un-ngls org/international_migration htm (last accessed on 9 February 2007)  See also 
http://www un int/iom/GMG html
19 See, eg, Taran 2000 International Migration 12
10 See Taran 2000 International Migration 18
11 See http://www ilo org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce pl?C097 and http://www ilo org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce pl?C1 
(last accessed on 2 February 2007)
12 ILO Fair Deal for Migrant Workers 10
•
•
•
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Convention 97 listed by member countries included article 2 (concerning free 
service to assist migrants for employment) and article  (equality of treatment 
between foreign workers and national workers). In respect of Convention 1, 
article 10 (equality of opportunity and treatment) and article 1 (the right of 
migrant workers to geographical mobility) were most frequently cited as pre-
venting ratification.1 The most common general objection to ratification was 
that the Conventions are not in line with current national laws and practice. 
Another general objection was that the Conventions are inflexible with respect 
to national systems and procedures, especially the social security system – in 
particular provisions that grant migrants and their families the same conditions 
as nationals, those that offer the same rights for irregular migrants, and those 
with respect to family reunification.1 However, despite the low level of ratifi-
cation, and the unlikelihood that this will increase significantly in the immedi-
ate future, it would seem that on the whole the ILO instruments have played a 
vital role in orienting national laws and regulations. Many countries indicated 
that they have either used the Convention as a model for national laws and 
regulations, or intend to do so.15
Taran1 reports that since the early 1990s, proposals have been made in 
various international fora for elaboration of guidelines or minimum standards 
explicitly less strict and specific than those of the 1990 UN Migrants Con-
vention. Such minimum standards or guidelines would substitute the Con-
vention’s explicit standards with general, vague and non-enforceable “prin-
ciples’’ instead of detailed and explicit standards backed up with monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms.17 In addition, a 200 survey indicated that there 
was little support amongst member countries for a new ILO Convention on 
the rights of migrant workers.18 As a result, in November 2005, a Tripartite 
Committee of Experts of the ILO adopted the ILO Multilateral Framework on 
Labour Migration: Non-binding Principles and Guidelines for a Rights-based 
Approach to Labour Migration.19 As the title indicates, the Framework com-
prises non-binding principles and guidelines for labour migration, and the vari-
ous role players (governments, employers’ and workers’ organisations, as well 
as relevant international organisations) are encouraged “to promote and respect 
its contents”. It is meant to supplement and not replace any of the existing 
ILO instruments.150 Despite its non-binding nature, one notable feature of the 
Framework is that it explicitly recognises the rights of migrant workers in an 
irregular situation. It encourages States parties to enter into bilateral, regional 
or multilateral agreements to provide social security coverage and benefits, as 
1 ILO Fair Deal for Migrant Workers 10-11
1 ILO Fair Deal for Migrant Workers 11
15 ILO Fair Deal for Migrant Workers 11  This is also a conclusion reached by the ILO during a 1999 sur-
vey of the relevant Conventions dealing with migrants  See ILO Fair Deal for Migrant Workers 20
1 2000 International Migration 19
17 Taran 2000 International Migration 19
18 ILO Fair Deal for Migrant Workers 1
19 See http://www ilo org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb295/pdf/tmmflm-1 pdf (last accessed on 
2 February 2007)
150 Introduction par 
well as portability of social security entitlements, to regular migrant workers 
and, “as appropriate, to migrant workers in an irregular situation”.151
4 2 Supervision and enforcement
It is generally accepted that one of the major shortcomings of the UN sys-
tem in general, and the ILO in particular, is the failure to enforce the standards 
contained in its instruments effectively. The individual migrant whose rights 
have been violated faces an uphill battle to have those rights enforced through 
the bodies established by the international instruments for exactly that purpose. 
This also hold true for any State party who alleges that another State party has 
failed to meet its obligations under any of the international instruments.
4 2 1 The UN and the enforcement of the Migrants Convention
The Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, consisting of ten experts serving in their personal 
capacity, has been established in terms of the Migrants Convention to monitor 
compliance with the terms of the Convention.152 The supervisory functions of 
the Committee are threefold:
to examine reports on the application of the Convention submitted by State 
parties;15
to receive and consider communications from a State party alleging that 
another State party is not fulfilling its obligations under the Convention;15 
and
to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals 
within a State party who claim that their rights under the Convention have 
been violated.155
As far as the first function is concerned, States parties are under an obliga-
tion in terms of article 7 to submit reports on the “legislative, judicial, ad-
ministrative and other measures they have taken to give effect to the provisions 
of the Convention”. Initially these reports must be submitted one year after the 
entry into force of the Convention15 and thereafter every five years and when-
ever the Committee so requests. Article 7 directs the Committee to examine 
these reports and transmit appropriate comments to the State party concerned. 
The Committee may also request supplementary information when consider-
ing the reports and receive observations from States parties on any comments 
made.
151 Par 9 9
152 Art 72  The number of experts will increase to 1 once 1 States have ratified the Convention (see http://
www unhchr ch/huricane/huricane nsf/view01/B87E9E85C71798C125CEF0085E50?opendocument 
(last accessed on 2 February 2007)
15 Art 7
15 Art 7
155 Art 77
15 The Convention came into force on 1 July 200
•
•
•
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The latter two procedures, namely to receive and consider State and indi-
vidual complaints, are in effect the only formal enforcement mechanisms con-
tained in the Convention. However, both procedures require ten declarations 
by States parties to enter into force, two of which must include the two States 
involved in the inter-State complaint.157 To date, no State party has made the 
necessary declaration. During drafting, those State delegations favouring the 
optional procedure prevailed over those favouring a mandatory inter-State 
complaints mechanism. The former argued that a mandatory procedure would 
be inappropriate because of the complexity of the Convention and also because 
it would discourage potential States parties from ratifying it.158 Those in favour 
argued that only through such a procedure would the Convention’s effective 
implementation be ensured.159 The decision was also taken during drafting to 
make the individual complaints mechanism optional rather than mandatory. 
Those in favour of a mandatory mechanism pointed to the relative efficiency of 
the individual complaints mechanism under other international human rights 
instruments, in contrast with the inter-State grievance machinery which was 
rarely, if ever, used.10
The Convention contains no formal enforcement mechanisms beyond the 
inter-State and individual complaint procedures. Even if a State party is found 
to have infringed the Convention, there are no binding sanctions available to 
the Committee to enforce against that State party, which is a general feature of 
UN human rights Conventions.11 Instead, the Convention shifts the responsi-
bility for enforcement to States parties themselves. Article 8 of the Conven-
tion obliges States parties to ensure the following:
that any person whose rights have been violated has an effective remedy;
that the person seeking a remedy is entitled to a review of his or her claim 
and to a decision by competent judicial, administrative, or legislative author-
ities; and
that remedies, when granted, be enforced by the competent authorities.
Article 8 obliges States parties to adopt the legislative and other measures 
necessary to implement the provisions of the Convention. Apart from these 
rather weak guarantees, those wishing to ‘‘enforce’’ the Convention will have 
to rely on informal mechanisms, which are essentially limited to publicity and 
action by NGOs.12
4 2 2 The ILO and the enforcement of Conventions
In general, the ILO relies on what has been termed “sunshine, carrots, and 
sticks” to enforce its standards and norms.1 The ILO has relied primarily on 
157 See Cholewinski Migrant Workers 19
158 Cholewinski Migrant Workers 19
159 Cholewinski Migrant Workers 19
10 Cholewinski Migrant Workers 195
11 Cholewinski Migrant Workers 197
12 Cholewinski Migrant Workers 197
1 See Elliott “The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labor Standards” 2000 International Economics Policy 
Briefs 2
•
•
•
the first (through its elaborate supervisory mechanisms) and the second (in the 
form of technical assistance). Only once, in the so-called Burma forced-labour 
case, has the ILO made use of the third. Until then, the use of sticks was lim-
ited primarily to peer pressure.1 Each of these mechanisms will now be dis-
cussed briefly.
4 2 2 1 ‘‘Sunshine’’: supervision of the application of Conventions
Supervision of the application of the Conventions of the ILO can take two 
main forms: a routine reporting-and-review process and ad hoc procedures for 
handling complaints by worker or employer groups or governments regarding 
another member’s compliance.15 In respect of the first, article 22 of the ILO 
Constitution requires member governments to report routinely on conventions 
they have ratified, while article 19 may be invoked to request periodic reports 
from members explaining why they have not ratified a particular convention 
and describing what they are doing under their national laws to achieve the 
goals of the Convention. The Committee of Experts on the Application of Con-
ventions and Recommendations (CEACR) reviews both types of reports each 
year and prepares its own report, noting instances of progress as well as prob-
lems in implementation.1 The CEACR may also choose to address a poten-
tial problem by submitting a ‘‘direct request’’ for additional information to a 
member government. Another layer of supervision and potential peer pressure 
is added at the annual International Labour Conference when the Conference 
Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations meets 
to review the CEACR report. In addition to a general discussion, the Confer-
ence Committee discusses individual cases and invites governments to explain 
problems in applying ratified Conventions. Its report may include references 
to cases of special concern, including “continued failure to implement”.17 The 
approach of the CEARC has been characterised as ‘‘conservative’’, not only 
with regard to the action that can be taken, but also with regard to the lan-
guage used.18 Questions addressed to national governments are ‘‘inevitably’’ 
couched in extremely courteous diplomatic language – so much so that “it is 
doubtful whether junior clerks in labour ministries understand easily what is 
being asked”.19 In respect of the second form of supervision, namely ad hoc 
procedures for handling complaints, article 2 of the ILO Constitution entitles 
any worker or employer organisation, not just those formally appointed as del-
egates to the ILO, to make representations when they are of the opinion that a 
member government is not complying with a convention it has ratified.
1 Elliott 2000 International Economics Policy Briefs 2
15 See Elliott 2000 International Economics Policy Briefs 2
1 Elliott 2000 International Economics Policy Briefs 2
17 Leary International Labour Conventions and National Law (1982) 19
18 Leary International Labour Conventions 15
19 Leary International Labour Conventions 15  Nevertheless, Leary International Labour 15-15 credits 
the CEARC with “persistence and patience in the pursuit of the elimination of discrepancies between 
national law and the provisions of ratified conventions”  She writes that “[t]he supervisory Committees 
have not always been successful in persuading governments to their point of view but their diplomatic 
persistence has been successful on many occasions”  
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These procedures highlight the importance of ‘‘ratification’’. Except for the 
article 19 procedure discussed above, no action can be taken against a mem-
ber government that has not ratified a Convention. This shortcoming was par-
tially addressed in 1998 with the adoption of the Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work. The Declaration requires all member countries 
that have not ratified one or more of the eight Conventions170 associated with 
these rights to report annually on what they are doing to promote the principles 
involved, though not the more detailed legal obligations in the Conventions.
In addition to the weak nature of ‘‘peer pressure’’, another problem with the 
supervisory system is the sheer volume of information that the organisation has 
to deal with annually. As more countries have joined, and more Conventions 
have been adopted, the total number of routine reports required has risen from 
an annual average of just over 00 in the 190s to 20 in 1998.171 Of these, the 
proportion submitted in timely fashion averages 71 percent. The high number 
of reports inevitably means that the CEACR is overburdened, leading to a sit-
uation in which few of the adopted instruments can be carefully examined 
with sufficient regularity. This has resulted in the CEACR constantly having to 
adjust the reporting periods, meaning that instead of examining compliance on 
an annual basis (as provided for in article 22), in practice it takes place every 
three, four or even five years.172
4 2 2 2 ‘‘Carrots’’: identifying priorities for technical assistance
Another objective of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work is to identify priorities for technical assistance. It is accepted that the
“most effective and sustainable means of improving implementation of core labor standards is to 
provide technical and financial assistance to countries that want to improve enforcement but lack the 
resources to do it”.17
The Declaration has already attracted increased financial contributions from 
developed country members who are interested in ensuring its effectiveness. 
Unfortunately, however, this ‘‘carrot’’ is limited to the eight core Conventions 
associated with the Declaration, none of which pertain directly to migrant 
workers.
4 2 2 3 ‘‘Sticks’’: more than peer pressure?
The ILO Constitution makes provision for a complaints procedure that poten-
tially extends the power of the ILO beyond that of mere peer pressure. Article 2 
of the Constitution is the provision reserved for the most serious cases and com-
plaints. It provides that a State17 which has ratified a particular Convention may 
170 These are the Conventions associated with the four core principles of freedom of association and the right 
to collective bargaining, freedom from forced labour, abolition of child labour, and non-discrimination in 
employment
171 See Elliott 2000 International Economics Policy Briefs 2
172 See Penning & Schulte International Social Security Standards: An Overview in Penning (ed) Between 
Soft and Hard Law (200) 18
17 Elliott 2000 International Economics Policy Briefs 
17 Unlike art 2 representations, art 2 representations may only be made by official ILO delegates
file a complaint that another ratifying State is not effectively observing the pro-
visions of the Convention. After a complaint is made, the ILO governing body 
tries to resolve it by seeking the member’s permission to send a Direct Contacts 
Mission to discuss the problem with the government in question. If the Govern-
ing Body does not deem it necessary to communicate the complaint to the gov-
ernment in question, or if, when it has made such communication, no statement 
in reply has been received within a reasonable time, it may appoint a Commis-
sion of Inquiry to investigate the charges.175 The Commission will report its find-
ings and, if appropriate, make recommendations as to how the member can make 
its laws and practices consistent with the relevant Convention. The member can 
take the Commission’s findings on appeal to the International Court of Justice. If 
the Commission’s findings are not appealed or if they are appealed and upheld, 
the country will be asked to report on what it has done to implement the Com-
mission’s recommendations.17 Significantly, article 33 provides that if satisfac-
tory compliance is not forthcoming, “the Governing Body may recommend to 
the Conference such action as it may deem wise and expedient to secure com-
pliance therewith”. While it is not clear what precise action the governing body 
(through the member States) may be able to take, it is generally accepted that it 
may take the form of economic or other sanctions.177
The article 2 procedure has hardly ever been invoked. Indeed, between 1919 
and 190, there was only one complaint and in the following 0 years an average 
of only six complaints per decade were received.178 In all, only six Commissions 
of Inquiry have been appointed and none of these Commission reports were 
appealed to the International Court of Justice. The application of the potentially 
powerful article  was not raised until 2000, when the governing body invoked 
it for the first time in the ILO’s history and recommended action against Burma 
(or Myanmar, as it is also known) in respect of the practice of forced labour.179 
The action recommended, although vaguely worded, is far-reaching. It does not 
directly impose sanctions against Burma, but calls on member governments, 
employers and workers, as well as other international organisations, including 
the United Nations, to “take appropriate measures” and to “reconsider … any 
cooperation they may be engaged in with [Burma]”.180 As a result, some coun-
175 Art 2()  
17 See Elliott 2000 International Economics Policy Briefs 5
177 See International Labour Office Reports I and II and Constitutional Questions, 29th Session of the Inter-
national Labour Conference (19) referred to by Elliott 2000 International Economics Policy Briefs 5
178 See Elliott 2000 International Economics Policy Briefs 5
179 Elliott 2000 International Economics Policy Briefs 5  In 199, a number of worker delegates filed an art 2 
complaint regarding forced labour in Burma  A Commission of Inquiry was appointed in 1997, and in 1998 
it called on the government of Burma to bring its laws and practices in compliance with the Forced Labor 
Convention (No 29) by May 1999  In the absence of a constructive response from the regime in Burma, art 
 was invoked in March 2000  The governing body recommended a variety of actions, including calling 
upon member States ‘‘to review their relationship with the Government of Myanmar [Burma] and to take 
appropriate measures to ensure that Myanmar ‘cannot take advantage of such relations to perpetuate or 
extend the system of forced or compulsory labor…’’’ See Elliott International Economics Policy Briefs   
The situation is to date still unresolved, with Burma recently threatening to withdraw its membership from 
the ILO in response to a recent report by the ILO that Burma has still not fully complied with its recommen-
dations (see in this regard Report of the Director-General: Developments Concerning the Question of the 
Observance by the Government of Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) Governing 
Body doc  GB 291/5/2, 291st Session, Geneva (Nov 200) par 11 and 12)
180 See Resolution adopted by the 88th Session of the International Labour Conference (June 2000)
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tries imposed economic and trade sanctions against Burma. However, despite 
these actions, many argue that the resolution underscores the weakness of the 
ILO because it cannot directly take action against a member country, but has to 
call on other actors to do so.181 In addition, the Burma case makes it clear that 
successful resolution also requires the cooperation of the ‘‘offending’’ govern-
ment. This was acknowledged by the ILO itself:
“The Myanmar case thus demonstrates that it is impossible to make effective progress against forced 
labour when there is a climate of impunity and repression against persons who denounce forced 
labour abuses, in the absence of the political will to clamp down on the military and local authorities 
who are themselves deriving economic advantage from forced labour practices.”182
However, the case of Burma is nevertheless encouraging for a variety of rea-
sons. It represents the first instance where the ILO has used its constitutional 
authority to respond to egregious violations, thereby setting a potential pre-
cedent for future similar action. Secondly, it shows that the ILO is not entirely 
‘‘without teeth’’ when it comes to violations of international labour standards. 
Even though the case has yet to be resolved after nearly ten years of activity, it 
has placed the issue of forced labour in Burma under the international spotlight, 
thereby forcing a recalcitrant government to take actions it may otherwise not 
have done. On the other hand, it must be noted that the case of Burma was a 
relatively “easy case’’ for the ILO. As one commentator18 has noted, Burma is 
“a small, poor, relatively isolated country and the violations were both egre-
gious and well documented”. It is clear that the real test of ILO credibility will 
come when it is forced to confront larger and more powerful members.
4 2 3 Incorporation of norms in national law – a better solution?
Although international treaties such as ILO Conventions are couched in 
terms of obligations for the ratifying State, the ultimate intended beneficiaries 
are individuals within the State.18 As Leary185 argues,
“[i]n the absence of a supra-national legal system, the effective incorporation of the norms of these 
treaties in national law is of crucial importance if they are to accomplish their purpose”.
States have adopted different methods of incorporating treaties in national 
law. Some States employ the method of “legislative incorporation’’, mean-
ing that the norms of treaties become national law by this method only when 
enacted through the normal legislative process.18 Other States have adopted 
the method of ‘‘automatic incorporation’’, whereby treaties become binding 
181 See Elliott International Economics Policy Briefs 
182 9rd Session of the International Labour Conference Report of the Director General (Report 1(B)): A 
Global Alliance against Forced Labour (2005) 2 par 109  
18 See Elliott International Economics Policy Briefs 7
18 See Leary International Labour 1
185 International Labour 1
18 Leary International Labour 2  South Africa falls into this group of countries  S 21() of the Constitu-
tion, 199, provides that “[a]ny international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted 
into law by national legislation”  However, the same subsection provides that “a self-executing provision 
of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with 
the Constitution or an Act of Parliament”  Whether the provisions of a treaty are self-executing or not are 
not always easy to determine  See Dugard “International Law and the South African Constitution” 1997 
European Journal of International Law 77 and Leary International Labour 8 et seq
law immediately upon ratification (plus publication or proclamation in some 
countries).187 For a variety of reasons, including the lack of legal certainty that 
characterises the system of automatic incorporation, ILO supervisory organs 
have frequently insisted on the adoption of legislation specifically implement-
ing ILO Conventions rather than on automatic incorporation.188 In any case, 
the special nature of fundamental social rights as a rule requires their specific 
implementation by the lawmaker; their mere ratification normally does not 
create an enforceable legal position for the individual.189 Under the Migrants 
Convention, States parties are specifically obliged to undertake to adopt the 
legislative and other measures necessary to implement the provisions of the 
Convention, which includes the introduction of effective remedies and enforce-
ment mechanisms.190	Against the background of the weak (and to date non-
existent) enforcement mechanisms contained in the UN Convention, action at 
national level becomes of paramount importance in order to ensure the Con-
vention’s efficacy.191	The incorporation of treaty norms in national law should 
go a long way towards providing more effective relief to individuals aggrieved 
by the failure of a country to adhere to or to implement the provisions of an 
international treaty.
4 3  The UN Migrant Workers Convention – effective protection of 
undocumented migrants?
The extension of protection to undocumented migrants by the UN Migrant 
Workers Convention represents a watershed or, as one commentator192 has 
argued, “a political and jurisprudential achievement”. With few exceptions,19 
all other instruments regarding migrant workers have provided protection to 
documented or regular migrants only. The question that remains is to what 
extent the incorporation of undocumented migrants have been successful, 
especially when viewed from the perspective of the human rights of the undoc-
umented migrant.
187 Leary International Labour 2
188 For additional reasons, see Leary International Labour 155-15
189 Report of the XV World Congress of Labour Law and Social Security 22-2 Nov 1997 Human Rights and 
Social Security Blanpain (ed) (1998) 21
190 Arts 8 and 8
191 See Cholewinski Migrant Workers 201
192 See Bosniak 1991 International Migration Review 758  
19 Unlike Convention 97, which confines protection to any person “regularly admitted as a migrant for 
employment”, art 9(1) of Convention 1 does extend rights “arising out of past employment as regards 
remuneration, social security and other benefits” to undocumented or irregular migrants  The objective 
of this part of the Convention is to extend to undocumented migrant workers some rights that derive from 
their having been employed  Eg, the fact that an undocumented migrant does not have a work permit 
should not deprive him or her from receiving remuneration for work that he or she has performed  Par  
of Recommendation 151 elaborates further on this right, and provides that “a migrant worker who leaves 
the country of employment, irrespective of the legality of his stay therein to any remuneration for work 
performed, including severance payments normally due; to benefits which may be due in respect of any 
employment injury suffered; and in accordance with national practice to compensation in lieu of any 
holiday entitlement acquired but not used; (and) to reimbursement of any social security contributions 
which have not given and will not give rise to rights under national laws or regulations or international 
agreements” (own emphasis)  While it is clear that only social security benefits that derive from past 
employment are covered, it is equally clear that these benefits are extended to both documented and 
undocumented migrants
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On the face of it, the Convention extends significant rights to undocumented 
migrant workers and family members. Apart from the right to social security, 
it also includes the right to due process, equal protection, access to the courts, 
rights to free expression, and so forth. This in itself is significant, and if prop-
erly enforced, could improve the status and situation of these workers con-
siderably. On the other hand, the Convention does allow States to afford lesser 
protections to undocumented migrant workers than to documented migrants, 
confirming the view that the extension of benefits to irregular migrants is 
done “in the context of an overall disapproval of the phenomenon of irregular 
migration”.19 For example, under the terms of the Convention, the undocu-
mented migrants do not have guaranteed rights to family unity, certain trade 
union freedoms, liberty of movement, participation in the public affairs in the 
State of employment, equality of treatment with nationals with regard to cer-
tain government benefit programs including housing, educational and health-
related services, and further employment protections.195
However, as Bosniak19 points out, the real problem with the Convention, 
and one which will seriously limit its efficacy as a human rights instrument for 
undocumented migrants, is that its provisions protecting States’ sovereign pre-
rogatives to control immigration will often effectively undermine or defeat the 
rights it provides to those migrants. As a practical matter, efforts to exercise the 
rights prescribed in the Convention may well expose the migrants to expulsion 
and punishment for immigration-related violations. This continued vulnerabil-
ity to prosecution for immigration violations will not only limit their ability but 
also their willingness to exercise the rights guaranteed to them under Part III of 
the agreement. For example, upon applying for social security benefits or upon 
presenting themselves for emergency medical care, undocumented migrants 
would almost certainly be required to display identification, or in some other 
way reveal the particulars of their status, “which could lead to questions and to 
unwanted contact with immigration officials”.197 There is nothing in the Con-
vention that would protect an undocumented migrant who finds him- or herself 
in such a situation. Article 79 expressly provides that
“[n]othing in the present Convention shall affect the right of each State Party to establish the criteria 
governing admission of migrant workers and their families”.
In addition, the powers of States to enforce their immigration policies 
may undermine one of the most significant rights extended to undocumented 
migrants, namely the right to enforce their rights against an employer irrespec-
19 Pieters & Schoukens Exploratory Report 8  
195 Convention Part IV  See also Bosniak 1991 International Migration Review 71
19 1991 International Migration Review 759
197 Bosniak 1991 International Migration Review 70  This is not mere speculation  In Denmark, eg, entitle-
ment to social assistance is reserved for people who have lived in the country for the previous three years  
Social assistance for people who have lived in Denmark for a shorter period of time is decided by local 
authorities acting under guidance laid down by the Ministry of Social Affairs  However, if a claim for 
social assistance is made by a person who has lived in Denmark for less than three years, he or she may 
be deported  See Roberts Migration and Social Security 211
tive of their unauthorised status.198 As Bosniak199 argues, even if an employer 
has violated this right by contacting immigration officials and notifying them 
of the migrants’ undocumented status,
“a State is unlikely to forego prosecuting an immigrant for violations of its immigration laws simply 
because his or her employer will also be subject to prosecution”.
Finally in this regard, the protection afforded to undocumented migrants may 
be limited in another respect. Even though a State cannot ratify the Convention 
while at the same time excluding the application of any part of the Convention, 
it may ratify with reservations as to specific articles.200 It is therefore possible 
that many States will ratify the Convention, if at all, with a variety of reserva-
tions as to specific articles which benefit undocumented migrants.
4 4 Social insurance and social assistance – equal treatment?
A typical characteristic of the right to social security is its universality.201 
The right presupposes that persons who are in a vulnerable position should be 
protected not because of their status as workers, or because of their national-
ity, but by virtue of their membership of society.202 However, in the case of 
migrants, the universal character of the right to social security has been consid-
erably undermined. Access to social assistance for migrants has always been 
more problematic than access to social insurance. Because social insurance 
schemes have to a large extent always presupposed a contract of service with 
the employer, nationality has not really been an issue, as least where coverage 
of migrants is concerned.20 For migrants, the absence of a nationality condi-
tion implies that migrants can be integrated into the social insurance schemes 
of the host-State. However, migrants nevertheless experience disadvantages in 
claiming social insurance benefits – disadvantages resulting from the specific 
legal requirements which may exist in national legislation.20 These include 
reduced pension rights as a result of broken insurance records, problems in 
accessing benefits abroad, and many others. The solution to these problems 
can be alleviated by national legislative efforts, but in the end the realisation 
of effective solutions requires the linking together of national social security 
198 Art 25()
199 1991 International Migration Review 71  In terms of art 8(2), States must impose sanctions against 
employers who employ irregular migrants in order to “eliminate the employment in their territory of 
migrant workers in an irregular situation”
200 Art 88  In drafting this provision, State representatives deliberately capitalised the “p” in “Part” to clarify 
its reference to entire sections of the Convention rather than to individual provisions  See Nafziger & 
Bartel 1991 International Migration Review 785
201 See Vonk 2002 European Journal of Social Security 18  Eg, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
formulates the right to social security for everyone as a member of society  Similarly, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expresses the right of everyone to social security
202 Vonk 2002 European Journal of Social Security 18
20 Vonk 2002 European Journal of Social Security 19  In a recent study of selected European countries, 
it was noted that where social security benefits are based on contributory payments, equal treatment 
between nationals and migrants is normally ensured  See Cholewinski The Legal Status of Migrants 
Admitted for Employment (200) 8
20 Vonk 2002 European Journal of Social Security 19
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schemes on the basis of international agreements.205 The point is, however, that 
in principle, nationality has not been a barrier to the extension of social insur-
ance rights to migrants.20
Extending social assistance to migrants, however, has been less straightfor-
ward. The reason is not difficult to discern: while the origins of social insurance 
schemes are based upon a reciprocal insurance relation between an insured per-
son and a social insurance institution, the origins of social assistance schemes 
are based upon the notion of unilateral charitable obligation. In this regard, 
the prevailing opinion is that “it [is] not the host-state but the state of origin 
which [is] responsible for offering support to the needy”.207 Nationality has 
gradually been replaced by the condition of territoriality in social security law. 
However, in social assistance this principle has never been fully accepted. The 
two principles are rather intertwined (at least in almost all European countries) 
where there are links between social assistance and the legality of residence.208 
This means that, in practice, only those with permanent residence status usu-
ally qualify for social assistance.209 While some countries simply deny access 
to social assistance to undocumented migrants, other countries only recognise 
entitlement to certain forms of minimal aid.210 However, most countries fol-
low an ‘‘in between approach’’ in which some (but not all) social assistance 
benefits are granted to irregular migrants.211 These benefits usually include non 
pecuniary services such as food, clothing, housing as well as assistance ben-
efits for children and minors.212 International law does little to improve the 
position of undocumented or irregular migrants in these instances, and social 
assistance is also largely excluded from international coordination treaties. For 
instance, Convention 97 specifically allows countries, in their national laws or 
regulations, to prescribe special arrangements concerning benefits or portions 
of benefits which are payable wholly out of public funds.21
205 Vonk 2002 European Journal of Social Security 19  For a discussion of the important role of interna-
tional agreements, see part  supra
20 This even holds true for irregular migrants  Art 8(2) of the Migrants Convention guarantees the “rights 
of migrant workers vis-à-vis their employer arising from employment”  However, during the drafting of 
the Convention, it was emphasised that the rights protected were only those that had “already accrued 
at the point the employment was terminated owing to its illegality”  See Cholewinski Migrant Workers 
189  
207 Vonk 2002 European Journal of Social Security 20
208 As Vonk 2002 European Journal of Social Security 21 points out, most States require legal residence for 
the right to social assistance, while immigration law may make the legality of residence dependent upon 
the condition that the foreigner does not rely upon public funds  
209 Eg, in Germany, the child benefit and the payment for raising children are only available to migrants 
in possession of a residence permit, but not those holding a temporary residence title  In the United 
Kingdom, Immigration Rules prevent migrant workers from accessing non-contributory or means-tested 
benefits (eg, income-based job seeker’s allowance and income support, housing benefit and council tax 
benefit, family credit, child benefit, and disability allowances)  See Cholewinski Legal Status 2 9
210 See Vonk 2002 European Journal of Social Security 29
211 One example is that of the Netherlands where, in terms of the so-called ‘‘Linking Act’’ (Koppelingswet), 
irregular migrants have since 1998 been fully excluded from all public services (secondary or higher edu-
cation, housing, rent subsidy, facilities for handicapped persons, health care and all social security ben-
efits, including national assistance)  However, legal aid, emergency health care and education for children 
to the age of eighteen years remain accessible to all migrants, including irregular ones  See Minderhoud 
“The Dutch Linking Act and the Violation of Various International Non-Discrimination Clauses” 2000 
European Journal of Migration and the Law 18-187
212 See Pieters & Schoukens Exploratory Report 11-12
21 Art  1(b)(ii)
It is clear that migrants pay taxes, including indirect taxes, from the moment 
of arrival in the host country, thereby contributing to the financing of the social 
security system. It is hard to make a fair case for allowing migrants to contrib-
ute economically, but then refuse to share the economic benefits and risks.21 
Even so, undocumented migrants (with the exception of access to certain 
forms of minimal aid) are in most countries excluded from social assistance 
benefits. It may be necessary to amend the relevant international instruments to 
expressly provide for the extension of certain minimum standards of protection 
to all migrant workers, especially those in an irregular situation.215
5	 Concluding	remarks
Migration and, by implication, migrant workers, are predominant features 
of the contemporary age of globalisation. Migration worldwide has shown 
a constant upward trajectory, with one in every 50 human beings worldwide 
living outside their country of origin.21 However, an equally defining feature 
of the globalised world is the generalised, widespread and commonplace viola-
tion of migrants’ human rights.217 The plethora of international standards con-
cerned with migrant workers and their families, many of which were examined 
in this article, certainly gives the impression that international human rights 
law has given adequate attention to the protection of the rights of this group. 
While the reach of the UN and ILO instruments is extensive, many problems 
remain. These relate to both the content and enforcement of the international 
standards. In respect of content, one of the most glaring shortcomings is the 
exclusion of irregular migrants from the reach of the instruments. Even when 
they are included, as is the case under the UN Convention, their protection is 
limited and in many cases inadequate. It was pointed out that efforts to exer-
cise the rights prescribed in the Convention may well expose the migrants 
to expulsion and punishment for immigration-related violations. In respect of 
enforcement, it was pointed out that both the UN and ILO systems of supervi-
sion and enforcement are inadequate and ineffectual. Lack of interest on the 
part of member States is also a defining feature of these instruments, with no 
significant ratification of any of the ILO instruments occurring during the last 
decade, and the UN Convention requiring thirteen years to garner enough sig-
natures to come into force eventually.
However, it appears that both the UN and the ILO have in recent years 
begun to pay renewed attention to the issue of migrancy. Two examples of this 
renewed interest is the appointment of the Special Rapporteur on the Human 
Rights of Migrants in 1999, and the adoption in 2005 of the ILO Multilateral 
Framework on Labour Migration. In addition, it is important to note that inter-
21 See Roberts Migration and Social Security 222
215 Vonk 2002 European Journal of Social Security 1 proposes this in the context of the European Union 
(EU)  He suggests that with the introduction of common immigration measures, the EU should consider 
adopting minimum standards of social protection for both asylum seekers and ‘‘illegal’’ immigrants  
21 See Taran 2000 International Migration 9
217 Taran 2000 International Migration 9
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national instruments have played a significant role as blueprints for reform of 
national legal standards.
In respect of social security specifically, the role of bilateral and multilat-
eral agreements cannot be overstated. These agreements have the advantage 
of flexibility by ensuring precise application of international principles and 
solving unique problems that may be experienced by the countries or regions 
concerned. However, despite the positive role that these agreements play, 
their overall reach is limited, covering less than a quarter of all international 
migrants. Particularly affected are migrant workers from the developing world, 
who are seldom covered by international agreements. Social security systems 
found in the developing world are often significantly different from and there-
fore incompatible with the systems in the developed world, which makes the 
conclusion of international agreements very difficult, if not impossible. The 
suggestion made in this paper is that, under these circumstances, the recipro-
city principle may need to be jettisoned in favour of unilateral action on the 
part of the receiving, developed State. In the absence of international agree-
ments, granting equal treatment to migrants and exporting pensions unilater-
ally to migrants from the developing world will not only present few techni-
cal obstacles, but, more importantly, endorse important standards of economic 
justice.
Finally, it has been pointed out that extending social assistance to migrant 
workers has been less straightforward than the extension of social insurance 
benefits. In most cases, migrant workers are excluded from benefits paid 
wholly or partly out of public funds, with those in an irregular situation bear-
ing the brunt of this policy decision. While few would deny a country the right 
to establish a minimum period of residence as a precondition for the receipt 
of social assistance benefits, it must be acknowledged that migrants pay taxes 
from the moment of their arrival in the host country, thereby contributing to 
the financing of the social security system. As the ILO notes, account should 
be taken of the fact that “the effective participation of migrant workers in the 
financing of national social security programmes is not limited to those con-
tributions which may be deducted from wages”.218 Excluding migrant workers 
entirely from all tax-funded benefits is a refutation of this contribution, and 
violates principles of social justice and fairness. Many countries acknowledge 
this contribution by extending some social assistance benefits to both regular 
and irregular migrants. However, this is done haphazardly, and, being depend-
ent on national law, inevitably differs from country to country. In the absence 
of international guidelines, this will continue to be the case. The time may be 
ripe to consider including the guarantee of some form of minimal social assist-
ance to migrant workers in the relevant international instruments.
OPSOMMING
 Migrasie toon wêreldwyd ’n stygende tendens. Daar word bereken dat een uit elke vyftig mense buite 
hul land van oorsprong woon. Wat egter ook ’n stygende tendens toon is die algemene en wydverspreide 
miskenning van die menseregte van trekarbeiders, m a w persone wat buite hulle landsgrense werk. Hier-
die artikel ondersoek die rol wat internasionale instrumente (soos uitgereik en aangeneem deur die Ver-
218 ILO Introduction to Social Security (1989) 159
enigde Nasies en die Internasionale Arbeidsorganisasie) asook internasionale ooreenkomste (bilateraal 
en multilateral) speel om die regte van trekarbeiders te beskerm. Veral die beskerming van trekarbeiders 
se reg op sosiale sekerheid (wat beide sosiale versekering en sosiale bystand insluit) kom onder die loep. 
Alhoewel daar onlangs positiewe ontwikkelinge op internasionale vlak plaasgevind het, en die rol wat 
bilaterale en multilaterale ooreenkomste speel bemoedigend is, dui die artikel daarop dat daar baie ruimte 
vir verbetering is. Tekortkominge word uitgewys en spesifieke voorstelle vir verbeteringe word gemaak. 
Laastens word die kwessie van die verlening van sosiale bystand aan trekarbeiders bestudeer. Daar word 
bevind dat meeste lande weier om voordele wat in die geheel of gedeeltelik vanuit staatsfondse gefinan-
sier word aan trekarbeiders te verleen. Hierdie stand van sake word gekritiseer op die basis dat dit neer-
kom op ’n miskenning van die bydrae wat trekarbeiders tot die staatskas maak deur middel van (direkte 
en/of indirekte) belastingbydraes, asook as ’n miskenning van die beginsels van sosiale geregtigheid 
en billikheid. Die tyd is ryp dat daar oorweging geskenk moet word aan die insluiting van ’n bepaling 
in die relevante internasionale instrumente wat ’n minimum vlak van sosiale bystand aan trekarbeiders 
waarborg.
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